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FIRM DYNAMIC GOVERNANCE
OF GLOBAL INNOVATION
BY MEANS OF FLEXIBLE
NETWORKS OF CONNECTIONS
Brigitte GAY
University of Toulouse I and ESCT School of Business/France
b.gay@esc-toulouse.fr
THE CHALLENGE OF NETWORK MANAGEMENT
One of the most important trends in industrial organization of the past quar-
ter century has been the growth of interfirm alliances. These alliances are
formed today with considerable ease across organizational and national
boundaries. A recent survey found that alliances already account for anywhere
from 6 percent to 15 percent of the market value of the typical company and
that alliances are expected to account for 16 percent to 25 percent of
median company value and more than 40 percent of market value for almost
one-quarter of companies by 2010. In current dollars, this means that for the
advanced economies as a whole, alliances will represent somewhere between
$25 trillion and $40 trillion in value (Accenture Survey, 1999). In the biop-
harmaceutical and in the software sectors, dynamic alliance formation
responds to technological shifts. Deloitte Research industry group (2005)
wrote that, akin to software networks, alliances in the biotech market will
become the foundation of “innovation ecosystems that companies must build
and nurture in order to drive sustained growth for the future”.
Firms are hence embedded into intricate meshes of business relationships.
Terms such as “the networked firm” or the “virtual organization” have been
increasingly used to describe an organizational form containing a network of
firms. For a firm to be situated in complex, unstable, networks formed by
inter-firm linkages, is believed to have significant implications for its perfor-
mance. Strategy is therefore conceptualized as a portfolio of links whereby
dynamic positioning into large networks is critical to competitive advan-
tage. A well-positioned company will be able to control or adjust what is
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happening in an industry or industry sector. How firms impose some control
onto the macro network, and how wider networks (all firms in an industry or
industry segment) constrain any individual firm, are major issues. It is thus
important to consider explicitly the way firms organize all their transactions.
Firms seek to position themselves within complex networks, and hence the
market, through the continuous configuration of ties.
A major stream in organizational research concerns alliances. Network
studies, however, are still scarce in economics though they have recently
achieved popularity through the recognition that social and economic
networks influence cumulative outcomes (Ahuja, 2000; Baum and Rowley,
2008; Cowan et and Jonard, 2008; Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996; Powell,
1996; Schilling and Phelps, 2007; Walker et al., 1997). Literature on allian-
ces claims that alliances are beneficial because they provide fast access to
resources (Gulati, 1998; Teece, 1992), in particular those typical of a more
established firm. The alliance is seen from a perspective of a resource-cons-
trained firm and as a condition for prevention of failure during the early days
of a company’s existence (Stuart, 1998). Direct alliance linkages were found
to facilitate knowledge flows between partners (Gomes-Casseres and al.,
2006; Mowery and al., 1996). Firms also access external legitimacy when they
are able to secure relationships with key actors. Other studies have focused on
the antecedents of network formation such as trust and the reduction, for a
firm, of risk and opportunism (Uzzi, 1996). Coriat and Dosi (1998) argue
that organisational competencies rely upon the complex, difficult to acquire,
skills of expert problem solvers and new knowledge creators. Moreover, the
importance of distance in knowledge space has been highlighted by a num-
ber of authors (Ahuja and Katila, 2001; Mowery, 1998; Noteboom, 2000;
Schoenmakers and Duysters, 2006). Knowledge space (distinct or with some
degree of overlap between firms) will affect the likelihood of forming an
alliance. The distance in knowledge space will also shrink after an alliance.
Importantly, many authors (Ahuja, 2000; Deeds and Hill, 1996; Owen-Smith
and Powell, 2004; Powell, 1998; Stuart, 2000) have demonstrated the impact
of direct and indirect inter-organizational alliances on performance and
innovation of firms. Koput and Powell (2003) report higher earnings and
survival chances of biotechnology firms with more kinds of activities in
alliances with more kinds of partner firms. These studies provide a strong
case for the examination of alliances in innovative sectors at multiple levels.
Finally, the biggest growth area in organizational network research is re-
presented by social capital and, more recently, complex network theories de-
veloped by physicists and mathematicians, with the analysis of the structure
of patterns that emerges from cross-cutting ties. The most fundamental traits
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of social capital and complex network theories are the shift from atomistic
explanations (at individual or link/dyad level) to the explanation of pheno-
mena in terms of linkages among a system of interdependent agents.
Fundamentally, capital is a surplus value and represents an investment
with expected returns. To capture the firm’s opportunity structure or extent
to which it can reach others, or be reached by others in the network, typical
social capital studies leverage on two important concepts, centrality (which
actors are best connected to others or have more power, influence) and con-
nectivity (whether and how actors are connected to one another through
the network).
To convey critical aspects of nodes connectivity, social network analysts
have depicted the way an actor is embedded in a relational network as impo-
sing constraints on the actor or else offering the actor opportunities. In par-
ticular, the concept of holes in social structure or “structural holes” was
developed by Ronald Burt to assess structural autonomy. Social structural
advantages derive from the brokerage and control opportunities created by
an open social structure. Actors can build relationships with multiple dis-
connected clusters and use these connections to obtain information and
control advantages over others (Burt, 1997). Actors who face fewer cons-
traints, and have more opportunities than others, are thus in advantageous
structural positions. Burt developed a measure of constraint as a summary
measure of lack of structural holes. The idea of constraint in industry is essen-
tial because it highlights the danger that firms having many ties to others
could actually lose autonomy rather than gain it, depending on the linkages
among the other firms. For Burt, the presence of structural holes in a
network is a condition to secure more favourable terms in the opportunities
actors choose to pursue. A recent study, using a sample of alliances in the US
communications industry, has shown that an actor’s connections to separate
clusters could lead to improved firm performance, implying that some level
of network cohesion could be positive if redundant contacts were avoided
(Bae, Gargiulo, 2003). The use of spanning cliques can thus be a deliberate
strategy to control different parts of a network (Baum and al., 2003). Burt’s
theory has particularly important implications for understanding techno-
logy-driven industries. There, the innovative activities of high tech, often
novel, firms force industries out of their normal boundaries into new sectors
and enhance the level of competition in traditional markets.
Another important network feature is centrality. Centrality is a charac-
teristic of individuals. There are three distinct measures of centrality. In par-
ticular, degree centrality measures the number of actors a given actor is
connected to. In alliance studies, this measure thus refers to the direct num-
ber of business relationships. In general, the greater an actor’s degree, the
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more power it has on the network. For example, a greater number of alli-
ances were associated with faster growth in a sample of US biotechnology
firms (Powell, 1996). Metrics such as degree centrality and network con-
straint are hence local and used to measure the social capital of an individual
actor or firm.
Node/firm communication throughout the whole network is taken into
account by two other metrics, betweenness and closeness centrality. Between-
ness centrality (Freeman, 1979; Wasserman and Faust, 1994) is conventio-
nally thought to measure the amount of traffic migrating from each node to
every other node that would transit through a given node, and therefore the
traffic load that this given node must handle, as well as the influence this
node has in the spread of information within the network in the sense of
being able to shut it down eventually (Borgatti, 1995). Betweenness centra-
lity hence captures the role of “brokers” or “bridges”: those that have most
indirect ties and can connect and disconnect large parts. A node’s closeness
centrality states how close an individual is to the others in the network. In a
flow context, closeness is ordinarily interpreted as an index of the expected
time until arrival of something flowing through the network (Freeman,
1979; Bavelas, 1950; Sabidussi, 1966). Organizations with high closeness
scores are thought to be in a favourable position to obtain new information
early.
Combined theoretical and empirical research on complex networks in
many fields has also led to two important results:
• Many large networks are scale-free (SF). They follow a power law
distribution of connectedness. This uneven distribution indicates
that, instead of the nodes or actors of these networks having a random
pattern of connections, a few hubs (tail of the distribution) “hold
together” numerous small nodes while the great majority of nodes
have few connections (head of the distribution), a fact that influences
considerably the way the network operates (Albert, Barabasi, 2002).
• Many large networks have the so called small-world property. The
small-world (SW) behaviour is characterized by the fact that the dis-
tance between any two actors or nodes is of a similar order of that of
a random network (with short path length between any two nodes
and therefore fast circulation of information, technology, products,
etc) and, at the same time, as for regular networks, high clustering
coefficient or cohesion in nodes neighbourhood. The SW model
underlines that changes in diffusion and spreading dynamics are
explicitly function of structure (Watts, Strogatz, 1998).
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Using visualization techniques as well as network metrics is thus interes-
ting in the sense that they can determine that a network structure is not
random, define different types of topologies, their dynamics, and address
important questions such as: Do firms live in a small world, in a scale-free
network with a “hub and spoke” structure, or a combination of both? Is the
structure of an innovation ecosystem stable? Have firms the capacity to
manipulate the complex system, and hence the economic environment, in
which they are situated? How does the macro network in turn influence
their context and may provide benefits or constraints? Can network metrics
be used as effective indicators of firms’ performance?
In our study, metrics borrowed from both sociologists (social capital theo-
ries) and statistical physicists (complex network theories) are proposed to
form powerful and complementary tools to help manage effective and tem-
porary forms of business configurations born of the need of rapid change. A
two-pronged analysis is therefore conducted, one that maps (visualisation of
different snapshots) and examines some properties of the whole network and
therefore considers the broader, rather than the local, neighbourhood of firms,
and one that looks at some properties of individual firms’ embeddedness.
In section 2, we give background data on the study. In section 3, we des-
cribe the methodology used. In section 4, we analyze the empirical data on
firm and complex network structures and their dynamics. We first measure
large scale statistical properties of networks, such as path length, clustering
coefficient, and connectivity distribution. We therefore follow a “standard
programme of empirical research of a complex network”, provided by Doro-
govtsev and Mendes (2003). In a second step, consistent with the seminal
work of Burt (2000) investigating the business perspective of individual senior
managers (with the often cited illustrative case of entrepreneurs Robert and
James networks), we present research results on the distinct network capital
of the three firms that dominate the biotech sector for the period studied.
We consequently measure network constraints to examine the competitive
advantage of structural holes for central firms when transactions span oppo-
site sides of holes. To look at the benefits and control of their network posi-
tion in the macrostructure, we also measure betweenness and closeness
centrality scores for the three firms. In section 5, we follow with a discussion
of theoretical and empirical work that seeks to understand how innovation,
network dynamics and strategy are entwined. Finally, in section 6, we draw
our conclusions and perspectives.
Using this analysis, we try to offer managers insights into the best ways to
dynamically evaluate and control their local and global environment, as
well as their firm’s specific position and its strategic relevance.
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BACKGROUND DATA
We chose a major biotech sector of the global pharmaceutical industry for
our multilevel analysis for a number of reasons. Emergence of biotechnology
has presented a new technology paradigm with respect to drug discovery and
development in this industry. It hence provides a natural laboratory for
researchers because they can observe how and when existing firms have built
their innovation capacities as well as potential links between innovation
and firms’ embeddedness in social structures, whether institutional, spatial,
technological, or other. Also of particular interest in the pharmaceutical
industry is the fact that deal making between biotech companies has inten-
sified in recent years. In the 2001-2003 time frame, biotech-biotech alli-
ances accounted for more than 56 percent of new deals. Some 1,023 intra-
biotech deals were reported in 2004 compared to only 199 deals in 1997.
Biotech companies were involved in 86% of the 2,761 deals signed in 2004
against 64% of the 311 deals signed in 1997 (Cartwright, 2005). The bio-
tech industry is therefore an increasingly mature industry that is no longer
wholly reliant on partnerships with big pharmaceutical companies.
Since previous studies in the biotech or health sector have concentrated
mostly on alliances formed before 1998 and on biotech-pharma alliances,
and considering the above data, our work focuses on more recent underlying
topologies which are the result of profound technological and business trans-
formations led by biotechnology in the pharmaceutical industry.
METHODOLOGY
Database and software
From a structural perspective, basic network analytic constructs are nodes
and ties, where nodes/actors are entities such as humans or firms and ties/
links represent relationships among nodes, such as business transactions or
web documents connected with directed hyperlinks. Networks are con-
structed when agents interact. This study thus considers that economic
agents/firms are not independent and, while still taking into account their
attributes, focuses on their linkages and embeddedness in macrostructures.
The database was assembled by querying specialized internet sites (lea-
ding sources for news releases and regulatory filings from companies throu-
ghout the world such as Business Wire et PRNewswire, as well as companies’
own sites) for alliances made in this biotech sector of the pharmaceutical
industry in the years 2000 to 2004, and employing Perl scripts to collect and
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parse data. Network studies tend to suffer from difficulties in specifying boun-
daries and thus in providing a coherent picture of network relations. The
boundaries of the macro network are set here by the selection of links/allian-
ces that are explicitly made in a major and well-defined area of the industry
containing firms operating under VEIC (Venture Economics Industry Clas-
sification) primary codes 4111, 4112, and 4121. These companies design and
deliver complex biological molecules (antibodies) for the diagnostics and the-
rapeutic markets. The monoclonal antibody market in 2005 was worth over
$13bn worldwide, representing a significant growth of 37% (BioPortfolio
Limited). The sample contains firms that squarely fall into the chosen VEIC
codes because of their core product offering, as well as big pharmaceutical or
incumbent biotechnology companies, such as Roche, Amgen, etc, that are
unavoidably transacting into this major sector. We find that biotech compa-
nies are involved in about 90% of such transactions; 82% of these occur
before phase 1 clinical trials. The sample is also concentrated in two sectors
(oncology and AIID –Arthritis, Immune and Inflammatory Disorders) and
four key markets: USA (59% of the alliances), Canada (6%), Europe (18%),
and Japan (9%). The sample is therefore representative of the global bio-
pharmaceutical industry.
We can therefore analyze the discrete network structures and dynamics
of firms, paying particular attention to the cohesion features of the different
firm-centric networks and their embeddedness within the broader biotech
network. Our sample contains 360 firms. The 2000-2003 period is domina-
ted by three firms or hubs, supplying us with the data needed to grasp the
industry perspective of individual central actors or firms. Since two of these
hubs actually lost their central position in 2004, we can indeed assess if
network metrics can be used as tools to predict firms’ business position, as
already demonstrated by Burt for entrepreneurs (2000). As we are interested
in a multi-level analysis including analysis of the evolving macrostructure
the three hubs are embedded in, we examined more specifically two discrete
periods for a longitudinal analysis, 2000-2001 (period 1) and 2002-2003
(period 2). Centrality and structural hole measures are calculated from one
period to another to compute firms’ access to capital through time.
We have used TETRALOGIE Network Display Software (IRIT) for the
representation of network evolving structures, Cyram Netminer in the cal-
culation of network statistical properties, and the Girvan-Newman (2002)
community-finding algorithm. The notion of “community structure” is
related to that of clustering, though it differs somewhat. A community
consists of a subset of nodes within which the node-node connections are
dense, and the edges to nodes in other communities are less dense. The
Brigitte GAY
70 Journal of Innovation Economics 2008/2 – n° 2
Girvan-Newman algorithm focuses on links that are least central i.e. most
“between” communities. The communities are thus detected by progres-
sively removing edges from the original graph. This algorithm allows us to
visualize the decisive structures in the neighbourhood of hub networks in
order to show how networks of players are interrelated.
Network formalism 
Centrality measures the importance of a node in the network. The simplest
of centrality measures is degree centrality, also called node degree. The degree
ki of a node i in a network is the number of links connecting it with other
nodes. Degree centrality is measured simply by the portion of nodes that are
adjacent to each node. The degree distribution (connectivity) function is
the probability of the nodes degree.
The neighbourhood of a node i at distance 1 from node is the set of ki
nodes. The clustering coefficient quantifies how close the local neighbour-
hood of a node is to being part of a clique, a region of the graph (a sub-graph)
where every node is connected to every other node. The clustering coeffi-
cient is calculated by taking all the neighbours of node i, counting the links
between them, and then dividing by the maximum number of links that
could possibly be drawn between those neighbours (Watts and Strogatz,
1998).
The path length between two nodes i and j is the smallest number of links
connecting them.
A network with n nodes and m links is a small-world network if it has a
similar path length but a greater clustering of nodes than an equivalent ran-
dom graph with the same m and n. A random or Erdös-Rényi graph is con-
structed by uniquely assigning each edge to a node pair with uniform
probability (Bollobas, 2001).
Betweenness centrality is defined as the share of times that a node i needs
a node k (whose centrality is being measured) in order to reach a node j via
the shortest path.
A node’s closeness is measured by the inverse of the sum of distances
from a node to all the other nodes, which is then normalized by multiplying
it by (n-1).
Formulas as well as extensive discussion about network measures can be
found easily in the literature (see for example Degenne and Forsé, 1994).
The constraint measure has been described by Burt (2000). Network con-
straint focuses primarily on the direct ties in ego’s immediate circle of con-
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tacts. It measures the concentration of relations in a single contact and
varies with three dimensions of a network: size or degree, density, and
hierarchy 1.
This research is both quantitative and qualitative. We assess (graphical
tools) and statistically control for theories in social and complex network
analysis but we rely also on field research that has allowed us first hand
observation into the specific resources that promote business success in the
particular industrial sector examined.
RESULTS
Statistical Mechanics of a Fast Paced Biotech Ecosystem
We have first performed basic statistics with the calculation of main proper-
ties that describe the SF or the SW model. The first observation is the occur-
rence in our sample of alliances in a major biotech sector, as for many real-
world networks analyzed, of joint SW and SF properties. Table 1 summarizes
the values for SW metrics for the whole period. Values expected for random
networks of similar number of nodes and links are added in row 2.
Table 1 – Small-World Features of the Biotechnology Network 
(period 2000-2003)
*the clustering coefficient of a regular lattice tends towards 0.75
The biotech sector is highly clustered, like regular lattices and unlike
random networks, yet has small average path length, like random graphs.
Our sample therefore forms a ‘small-world’ network. Moreover, average path
length value is even smaller than in a random network with constant linking
probability, in agreement with modelling studies which consider that for fast
innovation diffusion, path lengths should be shorter than those in a random
1. The hierarchy index is the Coleman-Theil inequality index applied to contact-specific con-
straint scores. This index is the ratio of ∑j rj ln rj  divided by N ln(N), where N is the number of
contacts, rj  is the ratio of contact j constraint over average constraint, cij/(C/N), and cij  is the
level of constraint contact j poses for ego (Burt, 1992, pp. 70-71). Hierarchy increases with net-
work size; it is therefore lower for a node which borrows a small network rather than a large one.
Clustering coefficient Shortest Path
Biotechnology network 0.27* 3.5
Theoretical random graph 0.004 6.1
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network (Cowan, Jonard, 2004). This value actually fits the theoretical path
length value expected from a scale-free network of the same size dominated
by a few, highly-connected, hubs (theoretical value = 3.78). Figure 1 shows
that the biotech network organizes itself in a scale-free state, confirming
that some firms dominate the connectivity and therefore the whole system.
These results do not occur by accident. The network is “wired” here
around central firms with extremely short path lengths that introduce mini-
mum distance between firms; network structure therefore influences the
speed and extent of diffusion between central actors in the system and all
other firms. If the biotech network is wired for fast communication, then the
question arises not only of which firms dominate the network but also of
how long central firms can actually control the network: in a technology-
intensive sector, such as the one studied here, rapid diffusion through short
path lengths indeed implies that firms can only build on their existing assets
in decreasing proportion through time unless they make a radical innova-
tion in one of their knowledge categories.
Figure 1 – Illustration of the biotech sector scale-free network architecture 
for period 2000-2003
a. Scale-free main component of firms’ business transactions. The network is char-
acterized by hubs, or nodes/firms with a large number of connections to other ele-
ments.
b. Degree distribution of firms’ transactions. The tail of the distribution follows an
approximate power law. The raw data have been binned.
Indeed, though the network displays SW and SF properties, its structure
changes over time. Two network maps of our sample corresponding to two
discrete periods describe firms’ positions and their evolution (Figures 2 and 3).
Three firms occupy key network positions over time. A detailed analysis of
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their transactions in our database showed that they have mostly (about 80%
of their transactions) partnered out breakthrough technologies, or specific
products derived from these technologies.
Therefore, as shown on the graph in Figure 2, though they connect to
most other firms in the network and clearly dominate the structure, they are
at the same time diffusing out innovative proprietary assets and will rapidly
lose control unless they build on new assets. It is certainly interesting to note
that, while these 3 hubs make more alliances than the 206 firms that form the
macro network for the two periods examined, these alliance scores neverthe-
less decrease in the second period and competitors clearly emerge (Figure 3).
Figure 2 – Alliances in the biotech sector for period 1
This industry segment is dominated by three “hubs”, firms A, B, and C.
To help visualization, nodes are replaced on the graph by bars, the size of
which being proportional, for each node, to its alliance score or degree.
A closer examination of our database shows the diffusion by hubs of cut-
ting-edge innovations needed to engineer fully human monoclonal antibody
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molecules and the shift of the industry in the second period towards compet-
ing technologies leading to the production of fragment antibodies and their
derivatives. These snapshots of a major biotech sector illuminate the com-
petitive advantage of hubs in a biotech network, but beyond this the com-
petitive pressure exerted constantly by the whole dynamic system. The
network forms at the same time a “hub and spoke” and a “small world” struc-
ture into which firms’ situation changes constantly. The short distances
between firms in these unstable systems permit at the same time domination
but also the decline of hubs in line with the spread of innovation and tech-
nological shifts.
Figure 3 – Alliances in the biotech sector for period 2
The graph shows that degree diminishes for firms A, B, and C compared
to Figure 2. Concurrently, the graph shows the emergence of new competing
firms (delimited by a ring on the graph). The position of nodes is kept con-
stant in Figures 2 and 3 to help track changes in alliance activity.
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It is thus crucial to look at how firms can actually leverage network posi-
tions for competitive advantage. We therefore turned to metrics derived
from socio-economic studies to examine the three hubs and whether we
could derive management prescriptions from this analysis.
Examining Evolving Firm Position 
and Networking Capability in the Biotech Sector
How do these three hubs stack up in terms of power (centrality) and auton-
omy (lack of constraint) as time goes by? Can they control the ecosystem
they are enmeshed in, if so for how long? How does sustained contractual
activity between all firms in the macro-structure affect these firms’ individ-
ual capital? We have used four network metrics based on a comprehensive
review of network research in sociology. Tables 2 and 3 summarize the values
for these metrics for the three hubs and two periods. 
Table 2 – Network Metrics of Top Three Firms for Period 1
Table 3 – Network Metrics of Top Three Firms for Period 2
As already observed in Figures 2 and 3, the three firms consistently dom-
inate the network with high value for degree of linkage (Dc) or direct num-
ber of transactions. The network degree centrality mean value is about 0.015
for the two periods. The hubs have also the highest rank in the first period
in terms of betweenness (Bc) and closeness centrality (Cc), which highlights
their effective control of the biotech sector. The low value of the constraint
index in the first period is also an indicator of their structural autonomy.
In the second period however, though still high, their degree centrality
decreases about two-fold and their constraint index increases, reflecting a
Period 1 Centrality Constraint
Firm Dc (rank) Bc (rank) Cc (rank)
A 0.3 (1) 0.37 (1) 0.36 (1) 0.034
B 0.2 (2) 0.26 (2) 0.32 (2) 0.051
C 0.15 (3) 0.18 (3) 0.3 (3) 0.07
Period 2 Centrality Constraint
Firm Dc (rank) Bc (rank) Cc (rank)
A 0.17 (1) 0.2 (1) 0.21 (5) 0.051
B 0.07 (3) 0.09 (5) 0.15 (55) 0.097
C 0.09 (2) 0.17 (2) 0.23 (1) 0.141
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loss of control and autonomy. Moreover, measurement of the closeness cen-
trality index reveals that firm B is disconnecting from the industry sector in
the second period (its rank goes from 2 to 55). Also the constraint index for
firm C in the 2nd period is higher than expected since firm C has about the
same value for degree of linkage as firm B but a higher constraint index with
higher hierarchy (hierarchy is 0.065 for firm B and 0.113 for firm C). The
density or local redundancy of its network also increases from 0.006 to 0.09
from one period to the other and has the highest value compared to other
hubs at all times. Hierarchy and density indicate network closure in the
neighbourhood of firm C.
Figure 4 displays the relevance of the network metrics used; if we com-
pare network structure in the neighbourhood of firm A in period 1 (lowest
constraint index as seen in Tables II and III) and firm C in period 2 (highest
constraint index), we see easily that firm A controls its network while, for
firm C, degree centrality is distributed at the periphery of the network. We
have for firm C, notwithstanding good indicators of firm position within the
whole system, a loss of structural autonomy.
Figure 4 – Local network position and connection structure 
of firm A (a) and firm C (b).
Community structure is extracted using the Girvan and Newman algo-
rithm. Firm A and C nodes are represented as squares, competitors of firm C
as large dots.
Firm A network shows low density and many structural holes with dis-
connected clusters. A detailed analysis of its transactions within the non-
overlapping cliques reveals the investment of firm A in different technolog-
ical fields (e.g. plantibody and phage display) as well as the use of co-part-
nering with small innovative bio-techs in some of these fields. Conversely,
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most of firm C’s contacts are interconnected and redundant by cohesion.
Firm C is highly constrained because other central contacts, chiefly compet-
itors, as revealed by the database, are involved in patent disputes with firm C
and have relations with firm C other contacts. These many potential leaders
get the same information as is available to firm C and this cannot be avoided
in the negotiations firm C has with each other contact. Consequently, both
firms B and C have ‘defects’ in their networks. In agreement with this anal-
ysis, firms B and C have since been acquired (end 2005 for firm B and in June
2006 for firm C).
This analysis has a practical implication for firms and the value of their
networks. To maintain its autonomy in a technology-intensive network, a firm
must ensure that it stays central while preventing constraint from binding its
strategic action.
IMPLICATIONS FOR STRATEGIC 
MANAGEMENT PRACTICE
Network approaches have appeared as new tools for use in industrial eco-
nomics and strategic management (Bala et al., 2006; Hamdouch, 2008; White
et al., 2005). As in these recent studies, we stress the importance for manag-
ers of closely tracking the dynamic topologies at macro level (sector and
industry) as well as in firms’ neighbourhood. We have shown that alliance
dynamics respond to technological shifts. How firms are situated within dif-
ferent technological cycles that may overlap is therefore an important ques-
tion. In particular, obsolescence of technologies occurs quickly and competing
technologies are very often disruptive.
Multilevel network mapping provides the context for the analysis of the
ability of firms to position themselves in unbalanced sectors of the economy
and control their business environment. The mapping exercise imposes that
three levels are considered simultaneously and dynamically: the focal firm,
firm-centric networks of alliances, and the macro network the firm is
enmeshed in.
The continuous use of visualization techniques and network metrics
could help pro-active alliance management of firms under rapidly changing
conditions as well as fast adjustment and counter moves to respond to the
constraints imposed by thousands of other players in an industry. Moreover,
the use of global and local network metrics permits tracking not only of
competitors but also the qualitative evaluation of evolving positions of firm
partners (old, current, or to-be) in all industrial sectors of interest. Are they
well positioned, strategically, technically, sector- or industry-wise, etc? In a
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global environment where relying dynamically on alliances is a major strate-
gic issue, the tracking of partners becomes an essential aspect of strategy.
Evaluate the network through local and global key metrics
A recent paper (Bala et al., 2006) has provided evidence that network met-
rics (clustering coefficient, path length, degree centrality) could be strong
predictors of firm growth in the software industry. Our study corroborates
these findings in that they demonstrate that network positions do matter as
well as the relevance of using key network metrics that describe firms’ posi-
tions and network structures at firm- and macro-levels. These studies hence
make a strong case for the strategic configuration of networks.
Centrality metrics (degree, betweenness, and closeness) are needed to
assess the position of the firm locally and globally. The use of the constraint
index as a key metric, compared to the measure of the clustering coefficient,
gives managers the ability to distinguish between cohesive structures that
may be redundant and networks with structural holes. A structural hole means
that distinct information flows are present in the firm ego network, a major
criterion especially in technology-intensive and highly competitive sectors.
We have found that legal agreements within our database were essentially
dyadic. In our analysis of hubs, redundant structures in a firm’s neighbour-
hood tended to reveal relentless competition. However, separate clusters of
firms were representative of partnering among a few firms while the hub
nonetheless also had many unconnected partners, thus increasing the num-
ber of structural holes in its neighbourhood. An example has been given in
Figure 4.
Strategy and Network Dynamics
In line with other works (Ahuja, 2000; Powell et al. 2005), our study con-
firms the crucial role of degree centrality in shaping network structure and
firm position in the network. Impressively, firm degree centrality can have
important consequences in engineering the wider network. Analysis such as
summarized in Table I indicates that the biotech network is then even more
efficient in moving innovations, products, and other resources through the
system than in a “small-world” because it in fact forms a small-world with
skewed distribution. These empirical results fit recent theoretical models
that demonstrate that innovation alliance networks can have combined
small-world and scale-free features (Cowan and Jonard, 2008). In our study,
diffusion occurs rapidly along very short paths and is brokered by hubs with
key core competencies that dominate the network while the diffusion occurs.
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The system dynamics and its very short paths present benefits as well as dis-
advantages. While short paths allow control of the system by hubs, they also
allow rapid take-over by firms with breakthrough innovations (as can be
intuited from Figure 3, the alliance network in this biotech sector has changed
since and is continuously evolving; data not shown).
Gulati (1998) proposed that ego networks create inimitable and non-
substitutable value, difficult for competitors to imitate and substitute. We
have actually seen that a great majority of nodes had few connections and
that hubs ego networks were undeniably idiosyncratic, in terms of partners
and structure, but also dynamically formed. The structural pattern of a firm’s
alliances may in fact have potential or drawbacks, as demonstrated here
through the analysis of different firms evolving ego networks.
Firms are consequently not endowed with a fixed set of core assets with
everlasting value, nor therefore with a fixed set of relationships. Firms should
hence develop, sell, and/or acquire different resources depending on their
existing resource stocks and their life cycle position (Gulati, Gargiulo, 1999;
Colwell, 2003). As in contemporary theory (resource-based view), they are
different in what they possess and do (Barney, 1991; Grant, 1996) but, as
others suggest (Kogut, 2000; Schumpeter, 1912) and as demonstrated in our
empirical study, the dynamics of knowledge diffusion and imitation will
reduce variety among firms unless new innovation is created. Central firms
thus have some degree of control over their market environment which, unless
they seek new innovations, is eroded as specialized innovation is absorbed by
others and new market innovation is brought in, mostly by new entrants
inside or outside the industry (Levinthal et al., 1993).
The double-sided relations between technical progress and economic
growth have already been underlined. As some put it, there cannot be
growth without technical progress (Metcalfe, 2002; Usher, 1980). Metcalfe
used the concept of “restless capitalism” as opposed to capitalism in equilib-
rium because, as he wrote, “the growth of knowledge cannot be formulated
meaningfully as a constellation of equilibrating forces” because knowledge
maintains “a potential for change that is ever present’. Therefore, in a dynamic
ecosystem with continuous building of new linkages, the aptitude of firms to
position themselves in unbalanced sectors of the economy where actors deal
with fast change, and to capture new innovation, can only be envisaged if
the firm is perceived as an open system which takes into account the
renewal and dynamics of innovation (Bouvier-Patron, 2001) and as a result,
the instability of industry structure.
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CONCLUSION AND LIMITATIONS 
OF THE STUDY
Lately, network research has underlined the need for multi-level theorizing
and empirical analysis of network strategy, as well as the need to consider
network dynamics. Multiple level linkages, at firm-, cluster-, and macro-
network, are unstable as well as recursive in the sense that changes at one
level necessarily induce changes at the others. Network results have thus
strong strategic implications. Managers must consider firm embeddedness,
and therefore capital, in complex, ever-changing, alliance networks. Struc-
tured alliance management ought to be very dynamic, as sustained firm per-
formance is the ultimate goal. We have shown that centrality and constraint
metrics measure network and therefore strategic “equilibrium”: in the fight
between constraint and power, but which is the winner, and for how long? In
our study, to survive, dominant business configurations are built upon central
positioning with little constraint. These configurations hinge on innovation.
To our knowledge, no other study has attempted to look specifically at
hubs, the structure of their alliance networks, the macrostructure or biotech
sector firms are embedded in, and the interdependency and co-evolution of
these multiple levels. However, our study has limitations. We have exam-
ined a single sector of the pharmaceutical industry for a limited albeit recent
period. We need now to study this sector from 2005 to 2008 to acquire more
knowledge of its life cycle and how its network properties and different hubs
will evolve. In particular, as suggested by Cowan and Jonard (2008), the bal-
ance between hub-like and small-world, more cohesive, structures may differ
depending on the maturity of the industry. Understanding the relations
between industry life cycle and multilevel network structures is essential. In
addition, geographical clustering may affect innovation flows. Firms that
have worldwide connections will also be more difficult to constrain. Finally,
we need to use data on more major high tech sectors within the pharmaceu-
tical industry as well as in other industries to evaluate whether our findings
can be generalized. Each of these limitations represents an exciting area for
future research.
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